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ABSTRACT
In recent years the practical effectiveness of formal strategic planning has come under
increasingly vigorous questioning by practitioners (Kiechel, 1982; Gray, 1986). A very large
number of problems and miscalculations often plague the specific steps in strategy formulation
and strategy implementation processes (Nutt, 1984; Lyles & Lenz, 1982; Mintzberg et al., 1976;
Moreover, recent scholarly research has produced equivocal evidence about the relationship
between strategic planning and overall organizational effectiveness (Hogarth & Makridakis,
1981; Armstrong, 1982; Schrader et al., 1984). Why are so many impractical, unwise, and
misguided plans chosen?
This paper begins by describing important, widely-shared, assumptions of academic-
generated strategic planning models — particularly as these assumptions relate to strategists'
ability to process information. Next, a brief survey of research evidence establishes that
strategic decisions — as opposed to routine decisions — are characterized by uncertainty,
complexity, conflicting interests, and ego involvement. In comparing the assumptions behind an
information processing approach for planning to the context of strategic planning operations, I
find that an information processing framework systematically de-emphacizes certain important
issues in planning. The following section offers empirical evidence about two principal
features of human information processing — cognitive expansion and cognitive reduction. How
do cognitive expansion and cognitive reduction interact with the formidable challenges of
uncertainty, complexity, multiple interests, and ego involvement in strategic planning?
Lastly, the paper briefly describes and evaluates a number of promising techniques geared
toward better aligning strategic planning methods with the practical aspects of strategic planning.
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I. DESIGNS FDR PLANNING SYSTEMS
l.THE PLANNING PROCESS.
High-quality strategic thinking is a scarce resource. Indeed, such thinking might
represent the best asset that a company owns. During the last 20 years, academics and
consultants have offered a wide array of ideas for designing strategic planning systems. These
systems chiefly aim to guide and improve strategic thinking. Exhibit One lists some
established planning models. Nearly all models incorporate goal setting, environmental
scanning, assessing alternatives, deciding on a strategy, and controlling plans; in one form or
another. In view of their similarities, one is prompted to search for a common intellectual
origin for these models. Why do we have these models of strategic planning and not some
different type of models? Why are these models offered now?
i. Information Processing Models and Systems Thinking.
Morbert Weiner's cybernetic theory of machine servomechanisms (Ueiner, 1948) plus the
development of the computer shaped modern thinking about thinking (Ashby, 1952; 1956).
Paradoxically, it was the development of computers that shaped ideas about thinking, not the
reverse (Lindsay S Mormann, 1977). A whole field of cognitive science; including cognitive
psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neurobiology and some social sciences have
tied their fates to the computer/mind metaphor. Naturally, these ideas also invaded the
organizational sciences. Contemporary models of human cognition (and planning) heavily rely on
a computer analogy of the workings of the human mind/brain (Simon 1957; Simon & March, 1953).
ii The General Problem Solver.
The General Problem Solver (GPS) was a computer program capable (in principle) of tackling
diverse problems such as playing chess, deriving geometrical theorems, and solving
cryptarithmetic (Newell & Simon, 1972). GPS was designed to mimic human problem solving. The
program asked "itself" three questions: What is my goal, what obstacles prevent me from
achieving that goal, and what operators can overcome the obstacles. GPS used means-ends
analysis to compare an initial state to a desirable goal. Then GPS broke a problem into a
hierarchical structure of sub-goals. It used a set of algorithms and heuristics (operators),
and sub-goals to search sequentially toward the goal state.
A wide range of objectives have stimulated the substantial effort expended in the search
for effective planning systems. Despite the kaleidoscopic panorama of these objectives, nearly
all of the recommended planning procedures closely adhere to an information processing model
similar to the GPS. Models of strategic planning routinely embody the essentials of this
analogy between human information processing and machine information processing. The
assumption that strategists are "information processors" is what makes models such as those in
Exhibit One credible and interesting. It is hard to think of how strategic planning systems
would be designed without that assumption. Systems theory also quietly inserts other
assumptions into the basic framework for planning.
iii. Derivative Assumptions.
• Strategic planning models follow a linear, step by step procedure.
In this respect, planning designs share a strong family resemblance to linear programming
models and other logical-deductive techniques. The computer analogy forces it.
9 Planning requires masterful performances in information-handling and decision making.
The GPS could not solve every problem. But it could follow straightforward algorithms and
heuristics to translate a problem into an accurate internal representation, hold the
information in memory without forgetting, and carry out complicated computations without making
errors.
9 The strategic planning model presumes a dominant, consistent set of priorities.
Planning models seldom recognize multiple legitimate interests, ambiguous, unstable, or
incompatible preference functions. Planning needs an "objective function" in order to reach a
decision. This is usually supplied by the CEO or the dominant coalition.
• Strategists' emotional status is screened out of planning.
Computers do not have emotions. The information processing model offers an image of clinical,
unemotional detachment, unaffected by petty personal motives and emotional undercurrents.
Is strategic planning best viewed as a form of information processing? To what extent do
these assumptions hold up in practice? Can strategists' meet the heavy demands of accurately
processing planning information? Are strategists "objective enough?" To begin to answer these
questions we need to investigate two questions:
S What information processing demands do strategic decisions make?
• What kind of information processors do strategists make?
II. THE INFORMATION PROCESSING DEMANDS OF STRATEGIC DECISIONS
1. "WICKED PROBLEMS'
Mason & Mitroff (1981) identified several characteristics of a pure, ill-structured,
"wicked", problem: no definitive problem formulation, no single criteria system or rule defines
correct solutions, no stopping rule for ending formulation process, an innumerable list of
possible operations on the problem, uncertainty about attacking the problem at a proper level,
and each wicked problem is unique. Four characteristics of strategic planning make it a very
wicked problem: uncertainty, complexity, conflicts of interest, and emotional involvement.
i. Uncertainty.
In order to succeed, strategic plans must diagnose, evaluate, and respond to
uncertainties. Accordingly, much scholarly and practitioner effort is devoted to problems in
forecasting and environmental scanning. Moreover, authors argue that organizational
environments are becoming increasingly "turbulent" (Toffler, 1970). Braybrooke & Lindblom
(1963), Mintzberg et. al. (1976), and Mason & Mitroff (1979) each point out that strategy
making essentially entails a process of defining and coping with risky, complicated, ill-
structured issues. Therefore, coping with uncertainty is a major element of planning.
ii. Complexity.
Strategists face a daunting task of learning interrelationships among hundreds of company
and industry phenomena. The complexity is intensified by unstable relationships among
phenomena, long chains of cause and effect, wide ranges of potential strategic action, and
large a number of participating individuals and groups. Writers such as Quinn (1980),
Mintzberg (1973), and Peters and Waterman (1982) place quite a bit of faith in strategists'
intuition. But, one can easily point out instances where intuitions have led to disasterous
strategies. Studies show that highly trained professionals such as bankers and stock-market
analysts (Clarkson, 1962) and business managers (Argyris & Schon, 1978) occasionally slip into
psychological traps and use inappropriate heuristics to deal with complex relationships. In
strategic management research, Schwenk (1984) and Stubbart & Ramaprasad (1985) have
demonstrated the difficulties which complexity poses for strategists. Based on research
evidence, making correct inferences about complex relationships presents a task which decision
makers find difficult to master.
iii. Conflict of Interests.
A particular organization represents only one minor interest in a broad inter-
organizational network (Bresser & Harl, 1986). Leading-edge models of planning acknowledge the
inevitable tradeoffs among organizational stakeholders, and try to incorporate multiple
interests into the planning process (Freeman, 1984). Additionally, the whole field of social
issues/ social responsibility in business reflects the changing and ambiguous nature of
corporate responsibilities to stakeholding groups. Contemporary strategists must grapple with a
range of contending interests which make claims on corporate resources and affairs.
iv. Ego involvement.
We know from interior experience that our private interests and emotions can often affect
our thinking. Freud claimed that our conscious, rational mind is largely subordinated to our
more powerful unconscious, emotional drives. The responsibilities and autonomy of general
management duties guarantee opportunities to advance self-interests involvement and occasions
for vivid emotional experiences. (Harr, 1985; Iacocca & Novak, 1935; Kleinfeld, 1986).
Therefore, general managers' emotional involvement in strategic planning forms an important
hidden issue to be taken into account as part of the task of planning.
2. SUMMARY.
The basic puzzle is this: Even though research has documented the uncertain, complex,
conflictual, and emotionally-involving nature of general manager's work (Mintzberg, 1973;
Quinn, 1980; Kotter, 1982; Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; McCall & Kaplan, 1695); planning design
proposals originate with information processing models having limited applicability to the
tasks at hand. The approach has been deductive-normative rather than empirical. A GPS model
is simply imposed on the strategy making problem with little direct attention to strategists'
observable capacities for planning effectively under such conditions, or the cognitive demands
implicit in planning according to these information processing models.
III. STRATEGISTS AS INFORMATION PROCESSORS: COGNITIVE ELABORATION
AND COGNITIVE REDUCTION.
A pivotal question about strategic planning can be posed as follows: If strategic
decisions are characterized by uncertainty, complexity, conflicts of interest, and emotional
involvement, can the average strategist's thinking satisfy the assumptions of the information
processing role envisioned?
1. HUMANS AS INFORMATION PROCESSORS?
Building an empirical foundation for the cognitive aspects of strategic planning from
scratch would entail an enormous task. Fortunately, research results from many fields have
already laid a partial groundwork. Relevant issues have received extensive study in the fields
of organization behavior, attribution theory, social psychology, social inference, behavioral
accounting, consumer decision-making, artificial intelligence, and behavioral decision theory.
Before launching into the research evidence on uncertainty, complexity conflict of
interest, and emotional involvement, it is important to give a brief synopsis of two key
background features of human information processing — cognitive elaboration, "opening
processes," and cognitive reduction, "closing processes."
1. COGNITIVE ELABORATION: "BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN. "
Strategic management tracts stress objectivity. "Objectivity" in the sense that right-
thinking observers of objects and events must agree upon what these objects and events
represent, and their derivative implications. Hence, theorists talk about the "objective
environment" (Bourgeois, 1980). But, cognitive science raises unsettling questions about
"objectivity." According to Bruner (1957):
"The most characteristic thing about mental life, over and beyond the
fact that one apprehends the events of the world around one, is that one
constantly goes beyond the information given."
Similarly, Lindsay & Normann (1972) describe an information-finding process as mainly an
interpretative activity:
"A large part of the interpretation of sensory data is provided
by the knowledge of what the signal must be, rather than from the
information contained in the signal itself. This extra
information comes from the context of the sensory event" (p. 133).
' Human information processors are unlike computers — people are not just information "clerks."
Instead, cognitive processes form a continuum. Automatic processes, requiring little
attention, little effort, and minor mental activity, occupy one end of this continuum.
Recognizing colors is an automatic process which offers good prospects for "objectivity."
At the other end of the continuum lie "effortful processes . . . greatly influenced by such
conditions as personal intention, learning, and social influence" (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).
Effortful processes invoke complex webs of sensing, coding, decoding, storing, selecting,
channeling, etc. For example, in studying human memory, Bartlett (1932) and Neisser (1967,
1982) found that remembering is a dynamic, erratic process, intrinsically shaped by personal
expectations, motivations, and ideas of what must-have-been.
None of the significant phenomena of strategic management — "environment," "organization
structure," "strategic group," "diversification," "general management," — are matters of
direct sensory perception (like color recognition). Surely, thoughts about strategy represent
an active-synthetic process, not an automatic process. As Neisser remarked:
"Although we cannot always see only what we want to see, we generally
can think what we like." (Neisser; 1967, p. 305).
Themes of active processing and "enactment" have recently appeared in organization theory
(Weick, 1979) and strategic management (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Chaffee, 1985). Enactment
connotes an incorrigible subjective, "mindful," and historical aspect of management, opposite
to many scholars' quest for impersonal, objective, grounds for knowledge and action.
Strategists are inquisitive about their industrial playgrounds. They want to know why things
happen, to fully understand the games they are playing. Strategists invent information,
building attributions into complex schematic representations of an "environment," which provide
a basis for inferences about strategic actions. However, their strategic knowledge and the
wisdom of their actions inevitably rest on the active, shifting foundations of innumerable
private memories, motives, experiences, interpretations and inferences (Hall, 1976, 1984).
Therefore, analysts search in vain for an "immaculate perception." There is no neutral matrix
for separating what is "given" from what is added by the "mind."
In their ability to actively process information, strategists differ greatly from
computers. This difference is important because it has large practical effects, but doesn't
receive much attention in strategic planning designs. Typical planning models ignore this
difference by stressing their devotion to "objective" information.
2. COGNITIVE REDUCTION: INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND HEURISTIC REASONING
The modern business environment teems with puzzling, complex, and uncertain facts and
events. Individuals command limited mental capacity for noticing, and attending to information
available to them (Miller, 1956). Simon (1955) wrote that in a context of infinite potential
information, managers must arrange an infinitely reduced problem space — in line with their
bounded rationality:
" Furthermore, managers "satisfice", choosing the first satisfactory
solution . . . content to rely upon ... a drastically simplified model of
the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world" (1976, p.xxix).
No strategist can possibly attend to more than a slight fraction of this tidal wave of
potential information (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). For them, information overload is a normal
condition. Studies show that coping with a tidal wave of information fosters subjective,
idiosyncratic heuristics in strategy making (Xeegan, 1974; McCaskey 1982; Schwenk, 1984;
Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985, Barnes, 1984). Because strategic planning involves enormous
informational complexities, it also necessitates drastic representational simplifications. 3ut
theorists who have offered strategic planning models have done little to explain how
strategists can dig out from underneath the information avalanche that their planning models
create. Even authors promoting explicit "information processing" approaches to strategic
planning (Galbraith & Nathanson, 1979; King & Cleland, 1978) offer few specific guidelines on
handling information overload in planning.
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3. SUMMARY.
Cognitive elaboration and cognitive reduction establish a background for thinking about
strategic planning systems. Planning models which ignore these basic parameters of thinking
processes and and their interaction with the demands made by strategic planning are taking too
much for granted. Such oversights may partly account for the many failures of planning in
practice. The following sections summarize research evidence about cognitive elaboration and
cognitive reduction as these affect strategic thinking.
IV. THINKING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY
1. ACTIVE INFORMATION SEARCH.
Search is a outreaching, elaboration process. Active search is best viewed as a positive
choice, not a negative filtering or a cue-driven behavior (Neisser, 1967). It begins at the
focal point of major uncertainties in the current organizational situation (Simon & March, 1958).
The greater the uncertainty, the greater the incentive to actively search (Ebert & Mitchell, 1975).
If decision makers cannot find the right information along simple, familiar, well-worn paths in
memory, they expand search; question people, head for their files, hire consultants, and so
forth. Research shows the overwhelming importance for later steps in decision making of
analysis, sorting, and storage of information during active search (Posner, 1973).
Studies of strategic management reflect the ad hoc nature of environmental scanning in
corporations. For instance, Mintzberg et. al., (1976) found evidence of extensive active
searching for strategic alternatives. Fahey and King (1977) found a wide range of scanning
practices. Stubbart (1982) found that scanning practices do not follow any predictable
evolution. Lenz & Engledow (1986) recently confirmed those earlier studies, finding that the
subjective, and contextual aspects of environmental scanning make it difficult to formalize as
a routine organizational process. Each of these findings emphasizes the elaborative elements
of scanning in practice.
2. CREATIVITY
Relentless research effort has gone into explorations of the psychology of creativity.
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Topics have ranged from studies of scientists (Roe, 1952) and writers (Barron, 1955), to
introspective accounts of the creative process (Wallas, 1926). Creative processes apparently
require intensive cognitive elaboration and reduction, spanning a protracted period (Wallas, 1 (
Simon (1966) described creative thinking as a hierarchical building-up of elements, i
"Familiarizing" is a long term process of experimenting with representations of a problem and
storing information about it. Long terra goals and succeeding waves of experience interact to
gradually alter goals and memory. After a task is set aside, some problem information and goal
information is always forgotten. When the problem is approached again, the problem solver
actively reconstructs goals and information, changing what is "known" about that problem.
This process explains how periods of "tinkering" can lead to sudden strategic inspirations.
Although valuable strategic insights seldom occur, we know that some strategists are quite
inventive (e.g. Steve Jobs of Apple; Ray Kroc of McDonald's; Alfred Sloan of General Motors).
But, other inventive strategies (e.g. the US Football League) lead to disaster. Hence,
creativity in strategic thinking comes as a mixed blessing.
3. AUTOMATIC ATTENTION.
Individuals react to information which is concrete, salient, emotionally interesting and
distinctive. Vivid information can arrive as an event (such as the Surgeon General's Report on
smoking; Miles & Cameron, 1982), or an impressive communication (Hijacker's demands). Nearly
everyone over 30 remembers November 22, 1963. Salient people and events offer themselves as
causes of other events (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Automatic attention has a sharp reductive
effect. But, salient phenomena also offer an opportunity for explanation, inference, and
innuendo — elaborative processes.
For a business, salient strategic information includes: sudden large changes in financial
ratios, unpleasant regulations, emergencies, scandals, flambouyant goings-on, or spectacular
competitive developments. Strategic management research documents instances of attention-
getting strategic issues (Dutton, et al., 1983; Keegan, 1974, Lyles & Mitroff, 1980; and
Kiesler SSproull, 1982) which diverted energy away from less-riveting but more important issues.
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Decision makers often ignore uncertainty to avoid the anxiety it would induce (Rokeach,
1960; Janis & Mann, 1977). Cyert & DeGroot (1970) found that firms acted as if interest rates
and unemployment policy would always remain at recent levels. Carter (1971) observed decision-
makers' efforts to reduce perceptions of uncertainty in a computer software firm. Borch (1968)
noted that corporate managers expressed annoyance with consultants who couched their advice in
probabilistic terms.
These findings suggest that executives might ignore important strategic uncertainties.
5. ESTIMATING SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES.
Behavioral decison theory devotes nearly its entire effort toward studying decision
making. Researchers have unearthed a large variety of disturbing findings (see Hogarth 1980,
and Taylor, 1984, for reviews):
People do not evaluate new information in the way that Bayes' Theorem should apply.
• Individuals inaccurately judge the importance of data types and sources
9 Decision makers ignore the base rate at which phenomena occurred in the past.
8 People believe that events are likely if they can easily recall or imagine instances.
6 Making effort toward a goal, or even anticipating such effort increases subjects' belief
that a desired outcome would actually occur.
© Even sophisticated scientists make unwarranted generalizations using results derived
from small samples.
• Outlying values overly affect estimates.
• People often make predictions about future events by anchoring on a cue (for example,
last year's profit) and adjusting for the present situation (this year).
Although much of this evidence comes from lab experiments with non-strategists, reseach
evidence in the strategy field indicates that strategists too experience severe difficulties
when dealing with uncertainty (Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977; Anderson & Paine, 1975; Wilensky,
1967; Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Yates, 1983).
6. SUMMARY.
Individual elaborative and reductive operations regarding uncertainty have important
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strategic consequences. Accurate forecasts are a prerequisite for sensible strategic plans.
Yet institutional forecasting efforts repeatedly fail (Ascher, 1978). Studies of forecasting
accuracy in a variety of realms, the GNP, the stock market, technology, and political events
always show an abysmal record (Hogarth & Macridakis 1981).
V. THINKING ABOUT COMPLEX STRATEGIC ISSUES
1. INTRODUCTION,
Strategists work under constant pressure to provide accurate explanations about events:
for themselves, for other organization members, and for important external stakeholders. But,
organizational events form a chaotic, diverse, and multi-dimensional realm. Therefore,
strategists have great latitude in rifling through events, channeling their attention toward
certain categories of events, and attributing cause and effect explanations — for creating
idiosyncratic interpretations. Strategists' conclusions about their experience, in turn, forms
the knowledge base for thinking about past, present, or future strategies.
2. LEARNING THROUGH CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS AND INFERENCES,,
Attribution research and concept-learning studies observe how people explain causes and
relationships among personality, behavior and events. According to that research, several
practices stand out (see Nisbett & Ross, 1980 for specific studies).
• Subjects believe that fortuitous associative-pairing of events prove causal connections.
9 Furthermore, learners are so anxious to find causal relationships, that they even find
explanatory rules for random symbols or events.
i Explanations for an event often favor personality and dispositional causes over
structural "scientific" explanations.
i Learning becomes particularly difficult when people attempt to inductively learn complex
rules and interactions.
©The higher the memory load, the poorer the learning rate.
© People avoid complex calculations in favor of simpler heuristics.
§ After subjects choose a tenable hypothesis they often accept confirming data and reject
disconfirming data.
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Learners accept less-convincing data when they receive a lot of it and it arrives slowly.
9 In the absence of apparent relationships, subjects are extremely insensitive to covariation.
® Errors are magnified when data are observed sequentially as in everyday experience.
These findings outline both elaborative and reductive tactics applied to relatively simple
learning tasks. But, a strategist's must attempt to understand more complex, dynamic
situations. Research shows that it is safe to conclude that strategists find it very difficult
to grasp complicated relationships and intricate industrial systems (Hall, 1976 & 1984;
Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1985).
3. COMPLEX KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES.
Patterns derived from in experience are organized into cognitive structures variously
called schemas, scripts, or cognitive maps (Abelson, 1976; Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Taylor &
Crocker, 1981).
"Schemas . . . represent our knowledge about concepts, objects,
situations, events, sequences of events, and actions. A schema contains, as
part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to
normally hold among consitituents of the concept in question" (Rumelhart,
1980, p.34).
Complex schemas represent elaborative processes because they are created through comprehension,
accretion, memory trace, tuning and refinement. New experiences and thoughts incrementally
modify and extend existing schemas.
Schemas also have a reductive, "closing" function. For example, knowledge is tied to
career histories (Dearborn & Simon, 1958). Schemas impose structure, impart meaning, and
define the parameters of interpretation for information, actions, and experiences; allowing
individuals to cut corners and make quick efficient diagnoses. Schematic knowledge resists
change, routinely surviving falsification (Kuhn, 1962). The general pattern is premature
commitments and insufficient revisions of schematic knowledge.
Perhaps strategists' knowledge of their organization, its competitors, characteristics,
goals, strengths and weaknesses, and so forth, reside in schemas (Walsh, 1985). Huff (1982)
conjectured that strategistic groups may also borrow schematic knowledge from each other.
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The few studies available suggest that strategist's schematic knowledge differs drastically
from the knowledge taught in business schools (Ford & Hegarty, 1984) and prescribed by theory
(Shrivastava & Lim, 1984). If strategic knowledge is retained in schemas, thoughts about
planning based on these schemas will restrict the elaborative thinking necessary for coping
with dynamic environments.
4. DEDUCTIVE REASONING .
Computers are perfectly logical. They can't operate any other way. But evidence
accumulating over the last 30 years suggests that human reasoning is unlike computer reasoning.
Individual reasoning frequently fails the test of formal logic (Gardner, 1985). But,
paradoxically, human reasoning works well for many tasks. The theoretical trick is explaining
both the power of human reasoning and its shortcomings.
Johnson-Laird (1983) has studied syllogistic reasoning. According to him, reasoners do
not translate premises into truth tables, follow syllogistic rules, and so forth. Instead,
they use mental models, an array of propositional representations of spatial, temporal, and
causal relations. These mental models are robust and viable under many conditions of
reasoning, but they incorporate many mistakes in formal reasoning. Mental models account for a
wide range of empirical data on reasoning. The models also work in computer simulation.
Strategists must draw important conclusions all the time. Therefore, the logical
abilities of strategists are an important subject in cognitive reduction. If strategists
reasoning does not follow the tenets of formal logic, then important adjustments to designs for
planning must ensue.
5. FORGETTING AND RECONSTRUCTING MEMORY.
Human memory is not like computer memory. After a monumental set of studies Bartlett
concluded:
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumberable fixed, lifeless,
and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or
construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole
active mass of past experience. . . It is thus hardly ever really exact,
even the most rudimentary cases of rote recapitulation, and it is not at all
important that it should be so (Bartlett, 1932, p. 213).
1£l
Remembering and forgetting form an interesting collision between elaborative processes and
reductive processes. Studies of memory reach many interesting conclusions, (see Eysenck, 1984;
Posner, 1973; Neisser, 1967 & 1982; for reviews):
§ The activity of remembering itself affects memory contents.
© Memories decay, losing many of their peripheral associations and becoming less complex.
© Details are forgotten while meaning is retained.
© More difficult mental operations produce more forgetting.
9 Eyewitness testimony is quite unreliable.
S When people encounter new information, memory structures sometimes fill in details about
unknown or uncertain aspects of seemingly familiar phenomenon.
i People forget information when it doesn't fit their agenda or their plans.
Since strategists must remember (and forget) prodigious amounts of information to support a
planning process, planning must take memory capabilities and functions into account.
6. REASONING BY ANALOGY AND METAPHOR.
Attractive analogies or metaphors can elaborate new options, unravel perplexing choices
and galvanize decisive actions (Isenberg, 1984). But simplistic metaphors and analogies can
also exert a powerful reductive influence over executives' thinking. For instance, the "domino
theory" of communist advance depends on both analogical and metaphorical elements. Careless or
unwarranted metaphors and analogies can also lead decision makers to false conclusions:
© Axelrod et al. (1976) uncovered examples of metaphorical reasoning in foreign policy
deliberations.
i Duhaime & Schwenk (1985) claimed that unwarranted metaphors and analogies interfered with sound
reasoning about acquisitions and divestments.
• May (1973) and Neustadt & May (1986) traced a large number of cases false analogies lead
top-level government officials to make bad decisions.
Considering the powerful attraction and pervasive use of metaphors and analogies, in
conjunction with their potential for disaster, the topic deserves attention during planning.
7. BOLSTERING SINGLE-ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES .
Cognitive bolstering of decisions has been extensively studied by social psychologists.
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Festinger (1957) wrote that decision makers experience "cognitive dissonance" after important
decisions; worries about the negative features of the chosen alternative - bother that decision
maker. To end these worries, the decision maker restructures her thoughts in favor of the
chosen alternative. Janis & Mann (1977) reviewed a large number of studies showing how
decision makers also bolster their decisions before decision making:
".
. .
when a decision maker reaches a point when one alternative is
clearly more satisfactory than others, he puts an end to residual
conflict by judging that the uncertain good consequences are more
probable than the uncertain bad consequences" (p. 94-95).
A number of studies show that strategic decisions often fail to evoke the complex thinking
which they deserve:
§ Alexander (1979), Mintzberg et al., (1976), and Nutt (1984) each catalogued decision
processes wherein only a single alternative was seriously proposed, carefully
evaluated, and implemented.
i Wright (1979) provided an example of how bolstering can affect strategy in his
discussion of how General Motors management delayed small-car proposals by
continually asking for more information on them.
© According to Yates (1983) auto industry executives discarded alternatives involving
relatively greater uncertainty.
8. SUMMARY.
Research evidence suggests that executives' abilites for learning about complex industrial
and organizational phenomena are more fragile, restricted and vulnerable than generally
acknowledged in the strategy literature. But precisely these abilities — disentangling
complex causal networks, skills in inference, and proficiency in detecting important changes —
are essential for effective thinking about strategy.
VI. THINKING ABOUT MULTIPLE INTERESTS
1. MORAL REASONING.
Kohlberg (1969) studied individuals' abilities to reason about moral questions. He
developed a classification system consisting of four stages of moral development.
Each level demarcates a more complex type of moral reasoning. Kohlberg found that few
individuals reach the postconventional level of cognitive development, the most sophisticated
18
and elaborative type of moral reasoning.
The moral reasoning of general managers can affect a strategic planning process,
particularly as a strategist must weight the rights, obligations, and rewards for various
organizational stakeholders. Scholarly and journalistic accounts report numerous examples of
poor moral reasoning affecting top management activities:
i Staw & Szwajkowski (1975) showed how environmental pressure promoted morally improper
business decisions.
• John Z. DeLorean was described as a business hero one year (Wright, 1979) and went to
jail soon after.
® Chief executives are charged with bugging offices and hiring spies (Harr, 1985).
i Recent books offer a portrait of arbitrary, greedy, and vengeful general managers
(Iacocca, 1984; Mintz, 1985; Perry & Dawson, 1985; Auletta, 1986).
2 . GROUPTHINK.
Janis (1972) reported that certain conditions: directive leadership, insulation of a
group, and lack of systematic procedures for search and appraisal; combined with high group
cohesion and high stress levels fosters groupthink:
".
. a collective patterns of defensive avoidance, lack of vigilance,
unwarranted optimism, sloganistic thinking, suppression of worrisome
defects, and reliance on shared rationalizations to bolster the least
objectionable alternative" (1972; p.399).
Many corporate strategy making situations increase the danger of "groupthink" (Janis &
Mann, 1977; Neustadt & May, 1986). Groupthink will produce unwarranted cognitive reductions.
Ironically, the current emphasis on developing cohesive and committed corporate cultures often
reads like a prescription for groupthink!
3. SUMMARY.
A few sensational, well-publicized cases of general manager's who trampled on the rights
of corporate stakeholders does not substantiate a blanket indictment of general managers' moral
reasoning. Instead, these incidents and reports highlight the importance of active cognitive
elaboration and reduction as a legitimate topic in understanding general management thought and
behavior. They also warn theorists that blind faith in the CEO's restraint and wisdom for
making tradeoffs between various stakeholders is not enough.
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VII. HOW EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT AFFECTS STRATEGIC THINKING
"Nothing is greater to one than one's self is."
Song of Myself, Walt Whitman
1. INTRODUCTION.
When strategy texts discuss general managers' personalities and values they chiefly stick
to positive role characterizations, such as the "organizational leader," "personal leader," and
"architect of purpose." (Andrews, 1980). They also stress the strategist's "objectivity." For
instance, although many articles talk about the problem of handling a poorly motivated labor
force, none discuss the problems of handling poorly motivated CEOs. This orientation hampers
the development of a realistic empirical profile of strategists.
2. EGO-CENTRISM.
Ego-centrisra permeates all aspects of thinking (Eysenck, 1984). People view world
events from their own privileged position in the world. Ego-centrism is universal and
significant. General manager's power and position permit them to indulge their personal
motives, needs, and emotional problems to an extent open to few other public figures — and
surely more than most organization members.
Lombardo & McCall studied over 100 top managers working in large firms. Among those 100
executives, over 70 reported having had top management superiors who were emotionally
intolerable. Higher-ups were described variously as, "... a living snake and a pathological
liar
. . .
Attila
. . . Being wrong never slowed him down ... he treated people like dirt . .
he knew everything, wouldn't listen and was pompous" (quoted in Argyris, 1985 p.6). We have no
reason to believe that general managers are immune to ego-centric motives or that their
emotional health is especially high (Kets De Vries & Miller, 1986). Popular books about
organizational culture and excellent companies even stress the desirability of emotional
commitment (Peters & Waterman, 1982). Therefore, modern organizational arrangements — such as
the rubberstamp board of directors — can operate to reinforce strategists' ego-centric and
emotion-driven behavior.
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3. ILLUSIONS OF CONTROL,
Langer (1975) and Larwood & Whittaker (1977) found that executive decision makers
overestimated the degree to which outcome-events submitted to their personal control.
Successful business strategists felt that they could easily control people and events.
Encouraged by overconfidence, elaborate but unrealistic plans can encourage strategists (and
other members) that future events will effortlessly into place according to plan. Hogarth &
Makridakis (1981) pointed out that inasmuch as planners thirst for control over important
future events, planners are especially susceptible to illusions of control (also, Schwenk, 1984).
4. INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY AND DOGMATISM.
Intolerance for ambiguity is defined as:
".
. . .
undue preference for symmetry, familiarity, definiteness, and
regularity; tendency toward black-white solutions, oversimplified
dichotomizing, and premature closure" (Adorno et. al., 1950).
Dogmatic individuals rapidly decide, but use little information (Taylor, 1984). Driver & Mock
(1975) reported that "decisive" decision-makers became rapidly overloaded by a complex,
structured task. They cling tenaciously to their decisions (Brengelmann , 1959).
If some strategists can only tolerate low levels of ambiguity, then they will probably
make ill-considered decisions in turbulent environments.
5. EXPERIENCE .
Executives' capacities for noticing and attending to phenomena vary as a function of
their experience, and training (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Stevenson, 1976).
The speed, complexity, and soundness of their reasoning is partly a function of familiarity and
knowledge-organization. Some theorists (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg & Waters, 1983; Isenberg,
1984: Ungson et al.,1981) claim that general managers accurately process information because
of their long and varied experience in decision making. But experience does not in itself
constitute an unalloyed panacea. What matters are the lessons drawn from experience and the
learning strategies applied to current situations (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
Studies of intuition show that it is highly fallible (Dawes, 1976). Some research shows
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that simple quantitative models can outperform experts in making certain judgments
(Dawes & Corrigan, 1974). Argyris (1985) showed that "learning" often went haywire during
strategy deliberations for subtle reasons which executives did not understand. Executives
making acquisitions had little insight into their own decisions (Stahl & Zimmerer, 1934),
I
This research suggests that the "closing," narrowing and focusing functions of experience
are problems in novel strategic settings.
6. MOTIVATION.,
People react to information relevant to their goals (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Setting
high objectives apparently improves employee performance (Locke, 1968). Theorists extend these
studies to reason that general managers having high personal stakes in strategic decisions will
improve their decision-making. Consequently, many theorists advocate management by objectives
to ensure strategists' compliance with organizational objectives (Andrews, 1980).
But high stakes (associated with high stress and high ego investment) can reduce cognitive
efficiency, not just raise it (Schroeder & Suedfeld, 1971; McGraw, 1978). High incentives
increase the liklihood that decision makers will apply previously acquired skills that work
well for simple routine tasks to complex, novel situations (McGraw & McCullers, 1979).
Incentives impair performance on intrinsically interesting, open-ended, non-obvious tasks
(McGraw, 1978). Incentives increase attentional selectivity, and decision making speed at the
expense of flexibility and accuracy; sacrificing cognitive elaboration to cognitive reduction
(Posner, 1973).Fischoff & Goiten (1984) concluded;
"Although the evidence is still sketchy, at the moment there is no good empirical
believe that judgmental biases are reduced appreciably . . . v/hen a
judgement carries high stakes . . . "(p. 506).
Therefore, the contemporary romance between MBO and planning is not not an unmitigated
benefit. High motivation can have adverse effects on the quality of strategic thinking.
7. DEFENSIVE REASONING .
Argyris found three characteristics of defensive reasoning infecting strategy making:
using soft data, making private inferences, and relying on untested conclusions (Argyris, 11
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Defensive routines are hard to spot and destroy because they are sustained by cultural norms of
caring and thoughtfulness — not by meanness or self-interest alone. Defensive routines
quickly take hold when top managers try to communicate threatening information. For example,
potential changes in strategy or poor job performance of another executive evoke defensive
reasoning
.
In top management settings, defensive routines corrupt learning and make important issues
undiscussable — upsetting a balance between cognitive reduction and cognitive elaboration,
stimulating cognitive reduction when cognitive elaboration would be more helpful. Defensive
routines mask an important gap between theories executives espouse and theories they actually
follow. Worse, executives remain largely unaware of their own reasoning processes.
Moreover, these defensive routines become self-reinforcing. Defensive reasoning can severely
undermining strategic planning. Argyris (1985) claims that it is the single largest reason for
failures in strategy implementation.
8. ESCALATING COMMITMENTS
Executives personal identification with particular strategies can entrap them by
encouraging "escalating commitments" to bad strategies in spite of feedback. Executives
attribute project difficulties to exogenous events, neglect investment limits, and ignore
information about costs (Staw & Ross, 1978). A combination of ego involvement (responsibility
for projects) and illusions of control, channel decisions toward "forcing" projects which are
not working. The stronger a strategist's original commitment to a bad project, the more likely
he/she will commit additional resources to it.
Staw (1982) delineated four conditions likely to favor escalating commitments: personal
responsibility for the action, personal responsibility for the consequences, public commitment
to the project, and the irrevocability of the commitment. These conditions surely characterize
many situations involving strategic commitments. For example, Duhaime & Schwenk (1985) gave
examples of escalating commitments in corporate acquisitions and divestments.
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9. STRESS.
"Hot" processes are set in motion by information which challenges the continued viability
of a corporate strategy (Janis & Mann, 1977). "Hot" decision making situations involve
uncertainty and doubt, important self interests, and less-than-perfect alternatives. These
situations create strong decision-maker ego-involvement, and engender acute anxiety about the
high risks and high costs of mistakes. Such conditions evoke emotional reactions such as
hesitation, vacillation, emotional stress, agitation, and apprehension. Research shows a
fairly consistent pattern of effects associated with high stress-high arousal (See Eysenck, 1 (
increased information selectivity.
i faster decision making.
i greater reliance on prior knowledge and behaviors.
# reduced ability to identify or discriminate unfamiliar patterns.
9 increased errors and impaired intellectual functioning.
9 When decision makers fear a threat, they try to increase their
control, and concentrate power.
In summary, stressful conditions evoke severe cognitive reduction.
A crisis often provokes or accompanies strategic planning (Mintzberg et. al., 1976).
It stands to reason that strategic decisions, decisions which often take place under time
pressure, that always involve high personal stakes, that require public commitments to
uncertain courses of action, can generate very high stress levels. Empirical research gives
little support to the notion that strategic decisions are not stressful or the notion that
strategists can remain clinically, calculatingly, emotionally detached from a strategic
planning process. Studies document how strategic decisions place strategists under emotional
stress (Sorenson, 1966; Nixon, 1962; Wohlstetter, 1963; Iacocca & Novak, 1984). These studies
show that stressful decision processes can lead to defective decision making processes, for
instance adherance to wornout strategies, capricious changes in strategy, or defensive
avoidance of strategic issues.
In spite of the obvious disruptions to strategic planning which stress might engender,
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practically no planning-design literature discusses relationship between planning and stress.
10. SIM1ARY OF EGO INVOLVEMENT
There is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe that strategists are especially
detached, neutral, or calculating, compared to other decision makers. On the contrary, their
unusually high autonomy allows them to give freer rein to their emotions (for example, anger,
impatience, or jealously) than other employees. Additionally, the work of a strategist has
task characteristics which stimulate emotional involvement: highly-visible personal
responsibility, high personal career stakes, risky decisions, dealing with conflicting
interests, and extensive interpersonal contacts. By suppressing these issues through
unrealistic assumptions, strategic planning designs lay the groundwork for planning failures.
VIII. PROMISING TECHNIQUES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, AND MULTIPLE INTERESTS
AND EGO INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGIC PLANNING.
Section III outlined a set of assumptions about human information processing consistent
with most strategic planning models. These assumptions surfaced because the generic strategic
planning models closely parallel the General Problem Solver. If these assumptions don't hold
to a sufficient extent, then the strategic planning model loses its promise and its power. For
example, if humans cannot master planning information, or if their emotional status greatly
influences thinking, the model, at some unspecified breakpoint, becomes unrealistic and
useless.
Evidence cited in sections, IV makes a strong case that executives experience much trouble
grappling with uncertainty. Additionally, even sophisticated decision makers experience severe
difficulties in trying to learn complex relationships (V). Moreover, strategists can overlook,
mis-specify, and miscalculate conflicts of interest. They have the motives and opportunity to
act selfishly (VT). Lastly, research shows that strategic decision making situations can evoke
powerful emotional forces (VII).
Obviously, these difficulties, singly or in combination, can undermine the quality of
strategic thinking. But this evidence does not amount to an indictment of strategists'
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abilities. Simply on the basis of this evidence alone, one is not justified in concluding that
strategists are "dumb" or ineffective. To what standards of intelligent strategic thinking
should one appeal? How high is the general level of strategic thinking across a set of
interconnected set of decisions? How important are the mistakes? How many strategists (or
plans) fall into these traps?
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that cognitive operations can easily endanger the
entire strategic process. For the most part, these cognitive habits are cultural phenomena —
not genetic or programmed phenomena. Therefore, difficulties can be mitigated, alleviated or
avoided altogether, thereby raising the level of effectiveness of strategy-making (regardless
of how one judges its present sufficiency). Theorists, consultants, and practitioners need to
realize the power of the GPS model has had in suppressing important issues in strategic
planning. Planning needs to incorporate effective means for coping with uncertainties,
complexity, conflict, and emotional involvement.
This section describes techniques which focus on dealing with these key challenges to
planning. My objective consists in summarizing a "toolbox" of useful techniques. The
discussion is aimed at theorists, consultants and practitioners who are grappling with the
practical problems of strategic planning for a wide array of strategic decisions in any
organizational context. The techniques cited here are ones which offer broad support for
strategic planning processes, not narrowly-defined techniques merely useful for one specific
stage of planning or special applications. For each technique I outline its principal focus,
the problems which it deals with (or makes worse!) and important limitations.
1. DIALECTICS AND DEVIL'S ADVOCATE .
Dialectical inquiry (Mason, 1969; Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979) and "Devil's Advocate"
(Cosier, 1978) are methods for testing the quality and justifications for strategic decisions.
When executives use dialectics or devil's advocate, strategic assumptions behind a plan must
face challenging critical evaluations.
i. Method. According to Mason & Mitroff (1981), strategic assumption surfacing and
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testing (a formal method for dialectics) is participative, adversarial, and mind expanding.
Dialectical inquiry requires dividing up executive groups on the basis of their strategy
preferences, getting them to probe into the assumptions which surround their favorite strategy,
testing these assumptions with logic, debate, and perhaps additional information gathering, and
finally accepting a group consensus on the best strategy. Under devil's advocate, policy-
making groups appoint an individual whose responsibility is to point out the shortcomings of
any decision.
ii. Benefits. These methods seem especially helpful for dealing with uncertainty,
multiple interests, arid ego involvement. Dialectics and Devil's Advocate promote the careful
examination of uncertainties, paying attention to stakeholder groups involved with strategy,
and they can expose hidden self-interests (or make them untenable).
iii. Limitations. Although dialectics is heralded as a general method for strategic
planning, its scope is limited to testing strategies already arrived at. For instance,
dialectics provides no help toward defining strategic issues, scanning, or generating
alternatives. Nor does dialectics offer any help regarding how to handle the complex analyses
dialectics might require. Additionally, dialectics practical effectiveness has become a matter
of debate (Schweiger et. al., 1986).
2. CREATIVITY.
A creative strategy which establishes a competitive advantage for an organization can
sustain that organization for decades. Generating creative strategies can represent a crucial
output of strategic planning.
i. Methods. A multitude of methods for improving creativity have been proposed. Zwicky
(1969) recommended morphological analysis. Many corporations have used synectics (Gordon,
1961) to develop metaphors and analogies to aid problem solving. "Conceptual blockbusting"
explains a variety of techniques which can overcome or sidestep mental blocks to thinking
(Adams, 1980).
ii. Benefits. Presumably, any of these methods can generate a novel, strategic idea.
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In doing so, vexatious problems of uncertainty and complexity might be completely swept aside.
iii. Limitations. Many different creative techniques promise to produce interesting
strategic ideas. But, with the exception of synectics, most of these techniques work on a very
narrow scope. That is, these methods are activities confined to a couple of hours one
afternoon and it's over. Such tactics are inconsistent with research on individual creativity
which stresses the need for a long developmental period. They don't tie into preceding or
subsequent activities, political issues, or existing organizational psychology. Nor do most
creative techniques provide for a systematic evaluation of their creative output. To put it
another way, these techniques are tactical, not strategic in their relevance to strategic
planning processes.
We have no studies which compare different creative techniques in terms of their strategic
planning utility.
4. MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE METHODS
• Composition of strategic teams. Jung (1924) proposed a theory of individual
differences in problem solving. Jung's theory divides decision-makers into four problem solving
types. These problem-solving types derive from individual cognitive preferences: feeling
versus thinking, and sensing versus intuition. Additionally, contemporary studies also show
that some people are more cognitively complex than others (Streufert & Streufert, 1978).
Higher cognitive complexity correlates with more fully developed abilities to differentiate and
integrate information, higher stages of adult development, accurate perceptions, and effective
behavior (Bartunek et. al., 1983).
Authors have discussed the implications of Jung's theory for constructing teams of
strategists (Ramaprasad & Mitroff, 1984). A strategist should collect a set of advisors whose
cognitive styles complement each other. The cognitive complexity prespective argues that those
persons selected should also score high on cognitive complexity, to correspond to the
complexity of strategic issues. The administration of simple standard tests qualifies
potential participants.
?«
Theoretical orientations. Bolman and Deal (1984) developed a method for analyzing
situations from multiple theoretical perspectives. They showed that "structural", "human
resources", "political", and "symbolic" approaches can frame complex situations. "Frames"
provide a method for structuring and categorizing uncertainty, for defining objectives, and for
eliciting alternatives. The method offers help in diagnosis, alternative generation, and
implementation of plans.
i Linstone et. al., (1984) offered another multiple-perspective approach for dealing with
complex technical decisions. Their model basically derives from Allison's Essence of Decision
(Allison, 1971). Linstone investigates the interrelationships of three broad areas: technical,
organizational, and personal; including elements technology, physical setting, socio-technical
setting, technopersonal setting, organizational actors, individual actors, political action,
and decisions. A team is chosen, including representatives from each perspective. These teams
are interparadigmatic rather than interdisciplinary. The output ranges from technical reports,
to vignettes, interviews, oral briefings, stories, and fictional formats.
ii. Benefits. Each of these theoretical perspective implies that teams of strategists
surpass individual decision makers in making quality strategic decisions. The primary
improvement comes from a the group's better appreciation of the complexities of the strategic
issue at hand by virtue of their differences in training, cognitive styles, and interpersonal
orientations. The models also highlight conflicts of interest, and the need to explore
uncertainties.
Linstone et. al. offers more systematic procedures than Bolman & Deal or Ramprasad &
Mitroff. Also, Linstone's ideas of expertise and communication cover a much broader range than
the Bolman & Deal model, and their procedures are sensitive to political and personal
sensitivities of implementing the process.
iii. Limitations. From a strategic planning perspective, the problem of integrating
multiple perspectives is paramount. Each of these models can generate much more complexity
than it is prepared to integrate.
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Surprisingly, Linstone et. al. are not sure whether integration is either possible or
desirable. Lastly, we have little evidence about the relative effectiveness of these methods
in practical settings.
5. DECOMPOSITION AND HIERARCHIES,
i. Decomposition methods. Simon (1960), Braybrooke & Lindblom (1963), Kepner & Tregoe
(1965) and described methods for problem separation. Decision makers must decompose complex
strategic issues into smaller elements so that an organization can take advantage of its
specialized knowledge and capabilites. Decomposition methods also facilitate parallel
information processing, which is faster than sequential processing.
MacCrimmon & Taylor (1976) explained how to look for the changes that precipitated an
issue, how to factor complex problems into simpler subproblems, and how to focus on
controllables to solve problems.
ii. Hierarchies. Hierarchies help individuals or groups to specify tangible and
intangible elements of a decision problem. Saaty et. al. (1982) developed a method called
"Analytical Hierarchies" to systematize decision making. Analytical hierarchies guides groups
in assessing complex decisions involving uncertainty, multiple levels of criteria, and multiple
alternatives. An optimum solution is calculated on the basis of quantitiative criteria and
estimates of decision parameters and consequences. Multi-attribute utility analysis (MAU) is
another technique for structuring complex decisions (Taylor, 1984).
ii. Benefits. These techniques have the virtue of using practitioner preferences and
knowledge in combination with with computationally simple methods. They have the power to
integrate complex considerations. Moreover, hierarchical methods have an image of rationality
and optimality consistent with the spirit of strategic planning.
iii. Limitations. In relying on practitioner knowledge, problems of validity,
reliability, and self-interest arise. Certain strategic considerations do not lend themselves
to computation. Furthermore, these techniques tend to suppress the ambiguous and conflict-
laden aspects of information and decision criteria.
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6. STRATEGIC DECISION SUPPORT
The rapid evolution of computing systems has led to the invention of new decision-aids for
strategic decision making.
S Cognitive Maps. Cognitive maps use matrix algebra to represent complex cause-effect
relationships (Diffenbach, 1982; Ramaprasad & Poon, 1985). Data is generated by
questionnaires, or console time from a strategist. Mapping easily adapts to planning because
the data derive directly from practitioners' knowledge of their industry, it is mathematically
simple, and the software runs on personal computers (Ramaprasad & Stubbart, 1986), and
practitioners do not have to rely on consultants' mumbo-jumbo. Software provides the user-
strategists with routines to map their knowledge, to explore interralationships, logic, and
consequences within their maps. Similar methods include systems dynamics (Forrester, 1976) and
KSIM (Kane et. al., 1973) a systems simulation approach used by interdisciplinary teams.
ii. Benefits. Methods in this category are limited to the narrow but important problem of
exploring and understanding complexity.
iii. Limitations. The techniques listed are each limited by reliance on strategists'
existing (possibly flawed) knowledge. Nor do these techniques offer any assistance for the
problems of conflict of interest or ego involvement in strategy making.
7. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
i. Method. Freeman (1984) described a method for "stakeholder analysis" which
incorporates the viewpoints and values of a wide range of organizational participants.
Stakeholder analysis integrates the need to acknowledge multiple constituencies with
traditional planning queries such as "What is our business." It is a highly analytical
procedure, calling for much information about a wide range of stakeholders.
ii. Benefits. Its major contribution is the central place it assigns to the analysis of
organizational stakeholders.
iii. Limitations. Freeman's method generates much complexity. But the stakeholder
technique doesn't give much assistance regarding how to synthecize the complex data it
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generates, or how to make decisions about stakeholder issues. Stakeholder analysis says
nothing about uncertainty. Moreover, it is surprising that a method so well attuned to
conflict of interest is inattentive to the conflict of interest and ego issues which using the
stakeholder model itself will bring to the fore!
8. PREVENTING GRQUPTHINK
i. Method. Janis presented tactics for preventing groupthink in policy making groups:
• leaders should not state decision preferences at the outset.
§ leaders should encourage criticism and doubt.
• every meeting should contain a 'devil's advocate'
9 split the main group into sub-groups to stimulate options,
i devote special time to studying rival's signals and build
alternative scenarios of rival's intentions.
© hold a second meeting after a decision is reached to voice residual
doubts and rethink.
• bring individuals from outside the core group to each meeting.
• encourage members to discuss the groups' deliberations with trusted
colleagues.
establish multiple groups (with separate chairmen) to discuss a
single issue.
ii. Benefits. If all these tactics can be put into place, then instances of groupthink
might be averted. Uncertainty can be acknowledged under these conditions. With outsiders
present, at least some differing interests might be weighed.
iii. Limitations. Preventing groupthink seems to depend on starting with leaders and
followers who are already unlikely to fall prey to groupthink. After all, "encouraging
criticism and doubt" for example, calls for restraint on the part of leaders and daring on the
part of subordinates. Janis' tactics will increase uncertainty, generate additional
complexity (e.g., additional groups deliberating).
9. DISMANTLING DEFENSIVE ROUTINES.
Argyris' studies show that defensive routines present the greatest obstacles to
successful implementation of strategic planning (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1982 & 1985).
i. Method. Dealing with defensive routines requires several difficult steps. First,
consultants diagnose and map strategic organizational issues. Next, facilitators guide
executives in exploring their defensive reasoning processes about strategic problems and
issues.
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Intervention techniques include interviews, observation, and role-playing using case studies.
Lastly, executives learn how to short-circuit defensive reasoning. Confronting and dismantling
defensive routines leads to using more valid data; more explicit premises and inferences, and
testable conclusions.
ii. Benefits. Executives learn skills for dealing forthrightly with threatening
information in strategic planning, decreasing the gap between "theories in use" versus
"espoused theories."
iii. Limitations. Argyris' method rests on very optimistic assumptions about how fast,
how efficiently, and how thoroughly groups of executives can learn to' deal with their emotions
and self-interests. The technique is also inattentive to uncertainty or complexity issues.
10. POPING WITH STRESS .
Organizations can take a number of steps to control the stress levels of executives who
are involved in "hot" strategic decisions.
i. Methods. Whetton and Cameron (1984) listed a number of steps for defusing stress:
• Time management training.
• Support networks for executives,
i Sponsor physical activities.
§ Arrange planning events, meetings, reviews, etc. in
ways that minimize stress.
ii. Benefits. Stress reduction has a positive effect on executive health and
executives' ability to process uncertain and complex information. Executives experiencing less
stress (especially ego-threatening stress) are less preoccupied with self-interest
calculations. Studies document some of the stress-reduction benefits of company efforts.
iii. Limitations. Stress reduction probably has no relationship to conflict of
interest issues, or complexity. Additionally, research evidence about the relative benefits of
different stress reduction programs is not yet available.
11. SUMMARY
.
I do not foresee any new totalizing framework to replace frameworks such as those listed
in Exhibit One. To search for a total, context-less, generalizable framework for planning is
probably a mistake.
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Instead, strategic planners need to know a broad array of techniques which can be flexibly
brought to bear within local planning circumstances and conditions.
Nevertheless, the techniques listed in section xx offer some scope for some integration.
Try to arrange elaborative processes and reductive processes to establish a wave-like pattern
of "openings" followed by "closings." For example, Acar et al. (1985) found a way to combine
dialectics and . Or, an expanding technique like stakeholder analysis might be
linked up to cognitive mapping, and in turn analytical hierarchies — reductive techniques.
IX. CONCLUSION
Strategic planning gained a large scholarly and practitioner following who hoped to use
planning to bring an organization's future under rational control. Scholars and practitioners
alike rushed pell-mell to transform the idea of planning into an routine organizational system.
Lately, the practitioners' complaints have caused a lessening of scholarly hyperbole and more
restrained claims about what planning might actually achieve.
To sum up, it is hardly surprising that strategic planning has proven to be a mixed
blessing for practitioners. I argued in this paper that information processing models of human
intelligence systematically diverted attention from pivotal issues which everyday planners
cannot safely ignore. Strategic planning theorists advocate an information processing model
for which key operations remain unprogrammable. Because uncertainty, complexity, conflict and
affective involvement demarcate strategic decisions from other kinds of decisions, the GPS
model does not provide an altogether secure theoretical basis for defining the shape of
planning. Its roots are firmly tied to theoretical models aimed at solving routine problems
instead of empirical experience with ill-structured problems. In this way theorists often
relegate the pivotal issues of uncertainty, complexity, and emotional involvement to a limbo
status — something to get worked out in practice — something the practitioners can
(implicitly) handle themselves. The implementation of planning lays the cognitive burden on
the strategists, who know full well that simple line drawings of planning skim over certain
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Inecessary (but missing) algorithms, for instance the algorithms for environmental scanning, or
generating the best alternatives. Treated like human computers, practitoners are denied
precisely the guidance which is most crucial to resolving their practical problems in planning.
Scholars are largely content with this state of affairs in planning (I think) because they
believe in the overall strength of the information systems model as a robust ideal for
individuals and organizations to follow, and because they cling to unwarranted assumptions
about strategists' intelligence, knowledge, and probity. Empirical studies furnish scant
evidence to support that view.
Remedying the damage caused by over-commitment to simplistic models of strategy entails a
more sophisticated, more careful, and interdisciplinary perspective on what planning is and
what it can accomplish. I advised theorists to stop treating strategic planning as a byzantine
clockworks developed for computing machinery and to begin coping with the excruciating
difficulties which planning engenders. If planning primarily aims at making high-quality
strategic decisions, then the intersection of strategic decision contexts and human (not
computer) capabilites form the central nexus driving design considerations.
)
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EXHIBIT ONE
A STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
AUTHOR(S)
Schendel & Hofer
(1979)
STEPS IN PLANNING
goal formulation/ strategy formulation/ environmental
analysis/ proposed strategy/ strategy evaluation/
strategy choice/ strategy implementation/ strategic control.
Steiner, Miner
& Gray (1982)
Andrews (1980)
Mazzolini (1981)
Lorange S Vancil
(1977)
Define company/ analyze customers/ analyze industry/
find opportunities, strengths, threats, weaknesses/
identify strategies/ evaluate strategies/ develop
objectives/ prepare plans/ monitor performance
Decision-need identification/ search for alternatives/
investigate courses of action/ review and approve/
implementation.
Set objectives/ evaluate strategies/ set strategies/
evaluate programs/ set programs/ set budgets.
Armstrong (1982) specify objectives/ generate strategies/evaluate
strategies/ monitor results.
Ryans & Shanklin situation analysis/ state philosophy/ alternative
(1985) scenarios/ master plan & contingencies/ mission
statement/ map strategies/ implementation and control.
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